Browse Items (254 total)

These chapters discuss how to understand the behavior leading up to a biological attack or theft of biological material. They also discuss biosafety and the threat posed by dual use technology.

This article assesses the risk of Rift Valley Fever being used as a bioweapon and weighs it against the burden placed on research by its addition to the select agents list.

This report summarizes a public symposium ran by the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine which discussed the potential benefits and risks of gain-of-function research.

This paper seeks to define criteria for a Global Catastrophic Biological Risk, or GCBR, which was previously defined as an event with the potential to produce tens to hundreds of millions of fatalities, alter the long term trajectory of humanity, or…

Discusses the potential dual-use threat arising from the synthesis of the first ever orthopox virus.

Looks at bioweaponry in the context of state-sponsored warfare. Created a scoring matrix to evaluate weaponization potential where agents were ranked from 0-3 across 12 risk attributes by NATO biodefense experts.

Focuses on synthetic biology advancement presenting the potential for being coopted into development of bioweapons.

Volume I discusses genetic modification technologies and their risk for dual use. Chapters 10, 11, and 12 are covered.

Volume II provides high-level overviews of the biological agents that are most commonly associated with biodefense activities. Additional chapters present the status quo of antibacterial and antiviral therapy and diagnostic development.

1969 Classification of Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, 1st ed.pdf
Provided a basis for stratification of agents into classes based on their risks and requisite biosafety protocols for working with each of these classes. This then allowed determination of the types of measures appropriate for each risk level/agent.
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