Volume II provides high-level overviews of the biological agents that are most commonly associated with biodefense activities. Additional chapters present the status quo of antibacterial and antiviral therapy and diagnostic development.
Looks at bioweaponry in the context of state-sponsored warfare. Created a scoring matrix to evaluate weaponization potential where agents were ranked from 0-3 across 12 risk attributes by NATO biodefense experts.
This paper seeks to define criteria for a Global Catastrophic Biological Risk, or GCBR, which was previously defined as an event with the potential to produce tens to hundreds of millions of fatalities, alter the long term trajectory of humanity, or…
This report summarizes a public symposium ran by the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine which discussed the potential benefits and risks of gain-of-function research.
This article assesses the risk of Rift Valley Fever being used as a bioweapon and weighs it against the burden placed on research by its addition to the select agents list.
Evaluates the risk assessment strategies of DHS. In regard to biothreat risk assessments specifically, this work focuses on the quality of the assessments for decision-making purposes, making recommendations for improvement.
The National Research Council evaluated the utility and soundness of the risk assessment process of DHS. In doing so, the evaluation provided information on how the process works, and the factors considered.
Considered impact of disease outbreaks with a focus on wildlife populations (as well as human and livestock). Implemented metrics for estimating the likelihood and consequences of spread of the pathogens.
The authors aim to create a multifactorial risk-priority scoring system for Category A BW agents using 10 criteria that include factors relating to disease potentiality, probability of attack, and prevention/intervention methods.
This report explores defensive strategies that could be used to protect air transportation spaces (specifically, airport terminals and aircraft) against attack with chemical or biological agents and makes recommendations to TSA.
Provides a pathogen-by-pathogen accounting of weapons agents, considering their weapons use/potential and contextualizing that with typical medical microbiology and epidemiology background information.
