Volume II provides high-level overviews of the biological agents that are most commonly associated with biodefense activities. Additional chapters present the status quo of antibacterial and antiviral therapy and diagnostic development.
This report summarizes a public symposium ran by the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine which discussed the potential benefits and risks of gain-of-function research.
This article assesses the risk of Rift Valley Fever being used as a bioweapon and weighs it against the burden placed on research by its addition to the select agents list.
These chapters discuss how to understand the behavior leading up to a biological attack or theft of biological material. They also discuss biosafety and the threat posed by dual use technology.
Aimed to develop a tool to assess the risk that individual emerging technologies might be misused for hostile purposes and to develop tailored governance strategies.
Evaluates the risk assessment strategies of DHS. In regard to biothreat risk assessments specifically, this work focuses on the quality of the assessments for decision-making purposes, making recommendations for improvement.
Focuses on the feasibility and probability of attack from a variety of actors. Creates a ranking scheme that considers four main areas: Perpetrator, Agent, Means/Media of Delivery, and Target.
The National Research Council evaluated the utility and soundness of the risk assessment process of DHS. In doing so, the evaluation provided information on how the process works, and the factors considered.
This report explores defensive strategies that could be used to protect air transportation spaces (specifically, airport terminals and aircraft) against attack with chemical or biological agents and makes recommendations to TSA.
Provides a pathogen-by-pathogen accounting of weapons agents, considering their weapons use/potential and contextualizing that with typical medical microbiology and epidemiology background information.
This report summarizes a workshop of the Forum on Emerging Infections that discussed the global response to SARS and the holes that it exposed in epidemic preparedness worldwide.
This report makes recommendations to the Department of Defense about how to accelerate research and development towards countermeasures against bioterrorism, under the assumption that it poses a threat.
