Volume II provides high-level overviews of the biological agents that are most commonly associated with biodefense activities. Additional chapters present the status quo of antibacterial and antiviral therapy and diagnostic development.
Looks at bioweaponry in the context of state-sponsored warfare. Created a scoring matrix to evaluate weaponization potential where agents were ranked from 0-3 across 12 risk attributes by NATO biodefense experts.
Evaluates the risk assessment strategies of DHS. In regard to biothreat risk assessments specifically, this work focuses on the quality of the assessments for decision-making purposes, making recommendations for improvement.
The National Research Council evaluated the utility and soundness of the risk assessment process of DHS. In doing so, the evaluation provided information on how the process works, and the factors considered.
The authors aim to create a multifactorial risk-priority scoring system for Category A BW agents using 10 criteria that include factors relating to disease potentiality, probability of attack, and prevention/intervention methods.
Also known as the Fink Report, presented findings of the Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, which investigated the risks of misuse of biotechnology research.
This book describes all microbial threats to human health, especially considering the intentional use of microbes as weapons and the consequences of scientific advancement.
This article aims to give recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if hemorrhagic fever viruses are used as biological weapons against a civilian population.
Authored by Theodor Rosebury, the author of Experimental Air-Borne Infection. The purpose of the work is to inform the public about biological warfare in the face of a lack of government transparency.
The author provides an example scenario of a biological attack and discusses what makes various agents potentially effective candidates for biological warfare.
Evaluates possibility of BW in response to public interest/concern. Reviews practical limitations to development and use of biological weapons. Covers Intestinal Disease, Respiratory Disease, Insect-Transmitted Disease, Infective (Non-Communicable)…
Assessed whether engineering pathogens capable of "sustained, human-to-human transmission and causing mortality and morbidity" is possible/probable. Also considers how such pathogens would compare to naturally emergent pathogens in these regards, the…