This report summarizes a public symposium ran by the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine which discussed the potential benefits and risks of gain-of-function research.
These chapters discuss how to understand the behavior leading up to a biological attack or theft of biological material. They also discuss biosafety and the threat posed by dual use technology.
Evaluates the risk assessment strategies of DHS. In regard to biothreat risk assessments specifically, this work focuses on the quality of the assessments for decision-making purposes, making recommendations for improvement.
Focuses on the feasibility and probability of attack from a variety of actors. Creates a ranking scheme that considers four main areas: Perpetrator, Agent, Means/Media of Delivery, and Target.
The National Research Council evaluated the utility and soundness of the risk assessment process of DHS. In doing so, the evaluation provided information on how the process works, and the factors considered.
Considered impact of disease outbreaks with a focus on wildlife populations (as well as human and livestock). Implemented metrics for estimating the likelihood and consequences of spread of the pathogens.
The authors aim to create a multifactorial risk-priority scoring system for Category A BW agents using 10 criteria that include factors relating to disease potentiality, probability of attack, and prevention/intervention methods.
This article aims to give recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if hemorrhagic fever viruses are used as biological weapons against a civilian population.
Authored by Theodor Rosebury, the author of Experimental Air-Borne Infection. The purpose of the work is to inform the public about biological warfare in the face of a lack of government transparency.
Description of transmission routes/pathways for grouping infectious diseases broadly (food- and water-borne, contact, air-borne, vector-borne, endogenous). Criteria for selection of infective agents that pose biological warfare risk. Rules out a list…
Evaluates possibility of BW in response to public interest/concern. Reviews practical limitations to development and use of biological weapons. Covers Intestinal Disease, Respiratory Disease, Insect-Transmitted Disease, Infective (Non-Communicable)…
