Description of transmission routes/pathways for grouping infectious diseases broadly (food- and water-borne, contact, air-borne, vector-borne, endogenous). Criteria for selection of infective agents that pose biological warfare risk. Rules out a list…
Evaluates possibility of BW in response to public interest/concern. Reviews practical limitations to development and use of biological weapons. Covers Intestinal Disease, Respiratory Disease, Insect-Transmitted Disease, Infective (Non-Communicable)…
Assessed whether engineering pathogens capable of "sustained, human-to-human transmission and causing mortality and morbidity" is possible/probable. Also considers how such pathogens would compare to naturally emergent pathogens in these regards, the…
This report assesses the utility of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) and decision support framework (DSF) in assisting the US Department of Agriculture in its reviews of select agents. It uses the method to assess 41 pathogens against 21…
US government charged NSABB with "evaluating and providing recommendations on the effectiveness of two major US biosecurity policy frameworks governing" research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP) and dual use research of concern.
Gives information on updates regarding the Division of Select Agents and Toxins' select agent scoring and ranking system. The review is contextualized by abundant criticism of the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment for overly complex modeling, lack of…
This article describes BioRAM, a tool to assist biorisk officers in the in the identification, the understanding, and the communication of biorisks present in a laboratory and how to mitigate those risks.
Gives information on updates regarding the Division of Select Agents and Toxins' select agent scoring and ranking system. The review is contextualized by abundant criticism of the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment for overly complex modeling, lack of…
Outlines the objectives of the Joint Force in response to any BW attack, especially those where physical and physiological protections cannot prevent infection. Provides details about roles and responsibilities within the Joint Force in the event of…
The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee met to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and severity of biological threats to our security as well as the preparedness to respond to these threats.
This is the third edition of Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare and aims to highlight the current state of science on individual agents and toxins and general response capabilities to prevent knowledge gaps and serve as a reference source for the…
In its Biennial Review, the FESAP considers the removal of Coxiella burnetti, Rickettsi prowasekii, Brucella abortus, Brucella suis, Brucella melitensis, and Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain from the Select Agents list.
This report is an historical analysis of US biodefense and bioweapons posture in order to understand the disparity between chemical weapons preparedness and biological weapons preparedness.
This hearing before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats, and Capabilities discussed the threat of biological weapons attacks from state and nonstate actors.
The purpose of this handbook is to serve as a concise, pocket-sized manual that can be used in a crisis to guide medical personnel in the prophylaxis and management of biological casualties.
This is the fourth report in the series that seeks to assess the level of preparedness in the states, evaluate the federal government�s role and performance, and offer recommendations for improving emergency preparedness in case of a biological…
This hearing before the Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness aims to assess current biological threats in order to decide the necessary countermeasures to be developed.